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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

6 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

DK USSR - Nuclear Test Talks: Moscow's reversal on 3 November of its long-held stand that the Geneva conferees could not discuss new US data on the difficulty of detecting underground tests demonstrates its realization that this was the weakest point in its position. The USSR can point to its reversal as evidence of its flexibility, in the "Spirit of Camp David," while in no way altering its basic contention that the annual number of inspections must be fixed by negotiation rather than by a technical formula. [redacted]

Poland: (Polish politburo member Jerzy Morawski, a liberal and long a close supporter of Gomulka, has been relieved of his party responsibilities for agitation and propaganda, [redacted])

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DK [redacted] Morawski's reported dismissal and other recent personnel shifts suggest that Gomulka has decided to adopt [redacted] a firmer implementation of policy in the economic, educational, and cultural fields, possibly indicating the beginning of a political trend away from liberalization. However, there are still no indications of a reversal of Gomulka's basic policies; for example, in the fields of agriculture and church-state relations. [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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ND Morocco: (As a result of world-wide news commentaries on the communique issued at the conclusion of Premier Ibrahim's visit here, the Moroccan public is being led to believe that evacuation of the five US bases in Morocco will begin immediately. The American ambassador in Rabat comments that, when it becomes obvious that no such "withdrawal" is contemplated, repercussions in Morocco could be very serious.) [redacted]

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OK

Pakistan: President Ayub has announced that elections for local representative boards, or "basic democracies," will begin in the third week of December. Ayub's public commitment on the timing of this first step toward a return to "constitutional" government in Pakistan apparently reflects his confidence at this time that he can retain firm control of the government while strengthening its popular support by allowing limited representative government. Ayub has assigned Foreign Minister Qadir to visit East Pakistan to develop popular support for the elections.

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OK

Thailand-Cambodia: Indignation is mounting in Thailand over Cambodia's appeal to the International Court of Justice asking for the return of a long-disputed temple ruins on the Thai-Cambodian frontier. Despite the Thai Government's professed disapproval of demonstrations over this issue, some have occurred, and Bangkok press commentary on Cambodia is becoming bitter. This emotional issue seems likely to reverse the recent trend toward improved relations between the two countries.

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III. THE WEST

Peru: Pro-Communist and ultraconservative opposition elements--which are frequently allied in Peru--have seized on a controversy between the government and an American oil company to whip up extreme nationalistic and anti-US sentiments. The

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DAILY BRIEF

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Chamber of Delegates on 2 November overwhelmingly approved a motion recommending that the government protest the US Government's alleged violation of the 1948 Aerial Mapping Agreement, abrogate the agreement, and cancel the oil company's concession. Foreign Minister Porras fears that further parliamentary debate will provide a Roman holiday for critics of the United States and US enterprises in Peru. [redacted]

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles.
NIE 11-5-59. 3 Nov 59. [redacted]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

The Soviet Position in Talks on Banning Nuclear Tests

The Soviet delegate to the Geneva talks on banning nuclear tests on 3 November withdrew long-standing Soviet opposition to technical talks on the detection of underground nuclear explosions. This reversal was probably intended to demonstrate Moscow's desire for agreement on major East-West issues and to enable the USSR to avoid the appearance of obstructing progress in the negotiations. Accusing the US of trying to block the talks by insisting on discussions of new technical data, the Soviet delegate proposed setting up a separate conference to establish the criteria for conducting on-site inspections on the basis of objective instrument readings in accordance with a fixed annual quota of inspections.

The Soviet leaders probably hope to ensure by this maneuver that any discussion of new US technical data, which the American delegate had threatened to present at the conference unilaterally, could be maintained within terms of reference acceptable to the Soviet position.

The Soviet delegate prefaced his proposal with statements aimed at undercutting any Western efforts to use the new talks to modify basically the conclusions and recommendations of the 1958 Experts' Talks. He pointed out that all parties have already agreed on the definition of adequate control. He made it clear that Moscow still maintains the "so-called" new seismic data will not modify the experts' conclusions since they already admitted the possibility of concealing explosions. He asserted that the USSR therefore did not interpret US insistence on discussing new seismic data as a desire to revise or review the experts' report itself.

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Polish Politburo Member's Reported Dismissal Suggests Opposition to Gomulka

Contrary to Western press reports that politburo member Jerzy Morawski resigned from his post as chief of the politburo propaganda section in protest over recent party policy decisions,

he was dismissed by the politburo and then informed of the action. Edward Ochab, who was recently replaced as agriculture minister, probably will take over Morawski's responsibilities in the politburo and possibly in the secretariat also.

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This dismissal and other recent personnel shifts suggest that Gomulka had decided to tighten party control in the economic, cultural, and educational fields, and that this decision met with some opposition in high party circles. Although long known as a close supporter of Gomulka, Morawski reportedly was criticized for his too-liberal policies in regard to the press and cultural matters and his advocacy of greater democratization in Poland. The recent decisions could be the beginning of a move away from the liberalization which has characterized the Gomulka era and an indication of significant factionalism within the party.

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[redacted] Polish Ambassador to Prague
Franciszek Mazur may soon return to take an important post in the Interior Ministry which probably would place him in control of the secret police (UB). Mazur was identified with many of the Stalinist excesses of the pre-1956 Polish regime, and should he take over the police, many Poles would expect a regression to the harsh policies of the Bierut era.

At the present time, there is no indication of a fundamental reversal of Gomulka's basic policies, for example in the fields of agriculture and church-state relations. The changes appear rather an attempt to solve internal Polish problems by strengthening party control and increasing efficiency.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Moroccans May Expect Early Evacuation of American Air Bases

As a result of news commentaries based on the press release issued at the conclusion of Moroccan Premier Ibrahim's visit to the United States, the Moroccan public is being led to believe that evacuation of the five American air bases in Morocco will begin immediately and be completed in a matter of months. The American ambassador in Rabat believes that these over-optimistic expectations are being abetted by similar rumors which are circulating among Americans at the bases and foreign diplomats. He anticipates serious repercussions when it becomes obvious that no immediate withdrawal is contemplated.

Meanwhile, the French Government has protested the language of the press release despite the fact that it was discussed with the French Embassy in Washington prior to publication. Having long pressed the United States to delay base negotiations with the Moroccan Government, Paris complains that the release gave a sense of urgency to forthcoming discussions of the US withdrawal. Premier Ibrahim is quoted by the left-wing Moroccan press as stating that these negotiations will begin within two weeks and be concluded in the "shortest time." The left-wing press, which is the vanguard of agitation for total evacuation of all foreign troops from Morocco, has also praised the premier for his "brilliant success in diplomacy" during his American visit.

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Pakistani Elections Scheduled for December

President Ayub has announced that elections for local representative councils, or "basic democracies," will be held during the last half of December, thus publicly committing the military regime on the timing of the first step toward a return to "constitutional" government. The regime had announced last June that these elections would begin in October, but the necessary preparations were not made in time. Ayub apparently now feels that preparations are adequately advanced and that he can retain firm control of the government while strengthening its popular support by allowing limited representative government.

Councils are to be established at five levels ranging from the village council to the provincial development advisory council. If Ayub promulgates a constitution calling for indirect election of the president, the popularly elected members of the village councils are to serve as an electoral college.

The mechanical preparations--delimitation of constituencies and preparation of electoral rolls--are virtually completed. The government, which will nominate one third of the members of the local councils, has prepared confidential lists of nominees. It is also preparing to bar from running for office a number of the politicians who were ousted by the 1958 army takeover and who remain unacceptable to the regime. Little interest in the elections has been evident at the local level, and the regime will probably step up its efforts to generate popular enthusiasm. Ayub has assigned Foreign Minister Qadir to visit East Pakistan to develop popular support for the "basic democracies" system.

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Thai-Cambodian Relations Strained by Border Dispute

Indignation is mounting in Thailand over Cambodia's recent referral to the International Court of Justice of the long-standing dispute over the Preah Vihear temple ruins on the Thai-Cambodian frontier. The ruins are a symbol for the competing nationalisms of Thailand and Cambodia. Despite the Thai regime's professed disapproval of demonstrations on this subject, some have occurred in outlying towns. Bangkok press commentary on the issue is becoming increasingly vitriolic, with some papers calling for a boycott of Cambodian goods and services. It is also being suggested that Thailand counter Cambodia's claim to the temple with demands for the return of certain Thai provinces ceded to Cambodia when the latter was under French rule.

Thai official comment on the issue has in general been restrained. However, Premier Sarit has taken a number of actions, such as launching a public subscription campaign to help defray court costs, which in themselves are relatively nonprovocative but may have the cumulative effect of exciting nationalist sentiment. Moreover, Sarit has not chosen to curb extremist statements in the press.

The Cambodian Government, maintaining that its approach to the World Court on the temple dispute is motivated solely by a desire to remove a latent irritant to Thai-Cambodian relations, has expressed injured surprise at Thailand's reaction. To date, Cambodian official statements and press commentary on this issue have been deliberately restrained, but the hardening Thai attitude--particularly press insults aimed at Premier Sihanouk--is likely to provoke inflammatory rebuttals. An aggravating factor is the penchant of the Cambodian ambassador in Bangkok for reporting hostile Thai commentary to the exclusion of moderate statements made by several Thai officials and the more responsible press.

(Cambodia's belief that Thailand is covertly supporting anti-Sihanouk Cambodian dissidents led by Sam Sary and Son Ngoc Thanh is an additional irritant.)

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[Redacted]

Controversy Involving US Oil Company Stirs up Anti-Americanism in Peru

Strong nationalistic and anti-American sentiment has arisen in Peru over a controversy between the Peruvian Government and a US petroleum company. The Ministry of Air has charged the company with obtaining "illegally" from the US Air Force a series of aerial photographs of its petroleum concession areas, in alleged violation of a 1948 aerial mapping agreement between Peru and the United States. Pro-Communist and ultraconservative elements, which frequently join in political alliance, have seized on the controversy to denounce the company and the US Government for "violating" Peru's military security and national defense.

On 2 November the Chamber of Deputies approved, with unusual unity among all parties, a motion presented by pro-Communist deputies urging abrogation of the 1948 agreement, a protest to the US Government and demand for indemnities, and strong measures against the company, including cancellation of its concessions and expulsion from Peru. Foreign Minister Porras expressed concern to Ambassador Achilles on 3 November that further parliamentary debate will be a Roman holiday for criticism of the United States and US investments in Peru. He said the Foreign Ministry is attempting to locate evidence that the Peruvian Government granted permission for the company's purchase of the photographs, which would "pull the rug out from under the agitators."

Another US petroleum company, Peru's largest producer, also came under congressional attack earlier this year. US companies have about \$143,000,000 invested in Peru's petroleum industry, and total US investment in Peru was estimated at \$820,000,000 in 1958.

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